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Introduction
In 2013, a general agreement was made by the European 
Council and the European Parliament on the reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the period 2014-2020. 
The agreement was the result of many years of negotiations on 
different issues and topics. One of the most heavily debated 
issues was degressivity and capping, aimed at providing a 
more equitable distribution of direct payments by farm. 
On the one hand, the possibility of reducing/limiting direct 
payments for large farms has always been a popular idea 
amongst liberal agricultural economists and decision makers 
throughout the history of the CAP. The need for ‘balancing’ 
direct payments was even expressed in the MacSharry reform 
proposals in 1992 when direct payments were introduced. On 
the other hand, degressivity/capping was heavily opposed by 
countries where large farms dominated the agricultural sector. 
It seems that the opponents have won as original ideas on 
degressivity/capping have largely been watered down after the 
2013 removal of modulation (Sahrbacher et al., 2015). The 
aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of degressivity and 
capping on European farm structures by reviewing the exist-
ing literature on the topic as well as by providing new evi-
dence from Hungary.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section pro-
vides a review of the existing literature on the impact of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on European farm struc-
tures, followed by a political economy analysis of degressivity 
and capping. The fourth section shows the uneven distribution 
of direct payments in Europe, followed by the presentation of 
the Hungarian evidence. The last section concludes.
The impact of CAP on European farm 
structures
A large amount of literature is dedicated to the investiga-
tion of the impact of CAP measures on structural changes of 
agricultural holdings. According to EC (2015), there were 
11 million farms cultivating 172 million hectares of agricul-
tural land with 22 million people in European agriculture in 
2015. EC (2013) suggests that the number of farms has been 
declining since 1975 and those remaining have become big-
ger both in terms of agricultural area and also in economic 
terms. On the whole, the majority of European farms are 
small, both physically and economically, but the average 
farm size is increasing. 
Generally studies conclude that the CAP has a high 
impact on farm structures in Europe (Table 1). Breustadt 
and Glauben (2007) investigated the driving forces behind 
exiting from farming in Western Europe based on 1993-1997 
data to 110 regions in EU-12 by simulating the simple theo-
retical model of structural change. Their results show that 
exit rates are lower in regions with more part-time farming, 
high subsidy payments and high relative price increases for 
agricultural outputs. The authors suggest that opportunities 
to combine farm and off-farm income as well as govern-
ment intervention slows down structural change in European 
agriculture. These results, however, should be handled with 
caution as CAP was significantly different in the 1990s to the 
way it is implemented today.
Bartolini and Viaggi (2013) analysed the determinants of 
changes in EU farm size based on data obtained from a 2009 
survey of over 2363 farm households in 11 Catudy Areas 
(CSAs) in 9 different European Countries. By also applying 
simulation modelling, the authors found that single payment 
scheme models affect the changes in demand for land and 
CAP abolition strongly reduces the intention to increase the 
amount of farmed area. Geographic variables, farm character-
istics and the number of on-farm employees are found to be 
factors relevant to explaining planned farmed area expansion. 
Happe et al., (2009) investigated the role of CAP in shap-
ing Slovakian farm structure by agent-based modelling as 
well for 2002 as a base year, based on data of 327 farms. 
Their results suggest that that direct payments had a strong 
impact on the structural development of Slovakian farms 
in the long run and have made farm structure increasingly 
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homogenous towards larger farm sizes. Moreover, the SPS 
system was found to persuade single farm holders, otherwise 
hesitating to exit from the sector, to stay in agriculture 
Some studies focus on the role of generation renewal 
in agriculture as a prerequisite for structural change in the 
sector. As fewer and bigger farms are offering fewer jobs in 
Europe, agricultural employment possibilities for young farm-
ers are also shrinking. Young farmers (classified as younger 
than 35 years) made up 6% of all farm holders in Europe, 
while elderly farmers (above 55 years) account for 55% of 
farms in 2007. Moreover, statistics suggest that elderly farm-
ers are generally not retiring and passing on their farms to the 
younger generation, thereby creating serious consequences on 
the overall growth potential of the sector. What is more, there 
are fewer young people in the agricultural sector than in any 
other sector of the economy (EC, 2011a). 
Davis et al., (2013) investigated the efficacy of incentives 
for new entrants to farming as an alternative to early retire-
ment schemes for farmers in Northern Ireland by employing a 
dynamic farm optimisation model for survey data with 2001 
as a basis year. The authors found new entrant schemes having 
a positive impact on entry of young farmers, especially in the 
case of interest rate subsidies on farm development loans.
A comprehensive review on the main challenges young 
farmers are facing with as well as the evaluation of the effi-
ciency of young farmer schemes can be found in Regidor 
(2012) as well as in Zagata and Sutherland (2015). Their 
results, based on simple descriptive statistics, suggest that 
young farmer schemes have very limited effects on encour-
aging new entrants to agriculture.
Other studies focus on the impact of CAP on farm exit in 
terms of structural change and studies generally argue that 
CAP plays a crucial role in retaining farmers in the sector. 
On the one hand, farm exit strategies under CAP elimination 
scenarios were analysed by Raggi et al., (2013), building on 
survey data carried out in 9 EU countries in 2009, ending up in 
a sample of 2300 farms-households. By using a probit Heck-
man model, results suggest that numbers of farm households 
opting to exit from agriculture increased sharply under the 
scenario characterised by the removal of the CAP. Their article 
holds the clear policy message that the current CAP payments 
are important for staying in/exiting farming activities, but the 
land reallocation process (as a consequence of land abandon-
ment) clearly requires more targeted instruments (towards 
young and active farmers, in order to avoid fragmentation, 
dispersion, or attraction only for speculation purposes).
Olper et al., (2014) examined the different instruments 
of the CAP on the out-farm migration in a sample of 150 
EU regions of the EU-15 over the period 1990-2009 by 
using fixed effects and GMM regressions. Results suggest 
that CAP payments generally contribute to keeping labour 
in agriculture and especially coupled subsidies seem to be 
the most effective in reducing out-farm migration through 
obligatory production (and hence labour input).
Peerlings et al, (2014) investigated the resilience of 
European farms with and without the CAP and applied bino-
mial and logit regression models on survey data on 11 case 
study regions in 9 EU countries conducted in 2009. Results 
show that farms choosing to exit are those most depend-
ent on CAP support, lease a relatively large share of their 
Table 1: Summary of studies on the impact of the CAP on the structure of agricultural holdings
Study Method Unit of  analysis Time Type Result
Breustadt and  
Glauben (2007) Simulation model EU-12 1993-1997 Ex-post
Government intervention slows down structural change 
in European agriculture
Bartolini and Viaggi 
(2013) Simulation modelling EU-27 2009 Ex-ante
Single payment scheme models affect the changes in 
demand of land and CAP abolishment strongly reduces 
the intention to increase the amount
of farmed area
Happe et al. (2009) Agent-based simulation modelling Slovakia 2002 Ex-ante
Direct payments make farm structure increasingly 
homogenous towards larger farm sizes 
Davis et al. (2013) Dynamic farm  optimisation model
Northern  
Ireland 2001 Ex-ante
New entrant schemes having a positive impact on 
young farmers, especially regarding interest rate  
subsidies on farm development loans
Raggi et al. (2013) Heckman probit model EU-27 2009 Ex-ante
CAP payments are important for staying in/exiting 
farming activities, but the land reallocation to young 
farmers process clearly requires more targeted  
instruments
Olper et al. (2014) Fixed effects and GMM regression EU-15 1990-2009 Ex-post
CAP payments generally contribute to keeping labour 
in agriculture and especially coupled subsidies seem to 
be the most effective in reducing out-farm migration
Peerlings et al. 
(2014)
Binomial and logit  
regression models EU-27 2009 Ex-ante
Least resilient and most CAP-dependent farms are 
most likely choosing to exit agriculture
Petrick and Zier 
(2011)
Difference-in-differences 
panel data regression Germany 1999-2006 Ex-post
Pillar I and II payments generally ended up in exit of 
labour from agriculture via investment and capital/
labour substitution effects
Tocco et al. (2013) Bivariate probit models
France,  
Hungary, Italy, 
Poland
2005-2008 Ex-post Decoupled payments kept labour in agriculture in the NMS but not in the OMS
Source: Own composition
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land, and are part-time and diversified farms. These farms 
were confronted with a relatively high drop in income in the 
event of CAP abolition and faced relatively high adaptation 
costs when adjusting their factor input use or simply did not 
have sufficient assets to be able to survive as farms in a no-
CAP world. The results also indicate that – besides being 
less likely to exit – more specialised farms with young farm 
heads are most resilient, and small, more diversified farms 
headed by old farmers are least resilient.
On the other hand, Petrick and Zier (2011) analysed 
regional employment impacts of the CAP measures in East-
ern Germany based on regional data of 1999-2006, resulting 
in 483 observations. By using a difference-in-differences 
regression model, the authors found that investment aids and 
transfers to less-favoured areas had a zero marginal employ-
ment effect. They also present evidence that full decoupling 
of direct payments led to labour shedding, as it made trans-
fer payments independent of factor allocation. Spending on 
modern technologies in processing and marketing and meas-
ures aimed at the development of rural areas led to job losses 
in agriculture. However, agri-environmental measures, kept 
labour-intensive technologies in production or induced them. 
Tocco et al., (2013) examined the determinants of exit 
from agriculture of CAP payments in France, Hungary, Italy 
and Poland in 2005-2008 by bivariate probit models and 
found that total subsidies were negatively associated with 
the out-farm migration of agricultural workers in Hungary 
and Poland, implying that the CAP hindered labour exit from 
agriculture. Conversely, results were exactly the opposite for 
France and Italy, representing ‘Old Member States’. When 
analysing impacts of policy changes, the authors conclude 
that the OMS reacted more to the decoupling in the period 
analysed while the NMS responded to the recent introduc-
tion of EU subsidies.
The political economy of  
degressivity and capping
The uneven distribution of direct payments has been on 
the Europe policy agenda for 25 years (direct payments were 
introduced by the MacSharry reform in 1992). Attempts 
to limit payments made to large farms have systematically 
been brought up in all CAP reforms so far (Sahrbacher et al., 
2015). As 80% of payments are received by 20% of farms 
in Europe, the idea seems reasonable and has gained wide 
public support.
However, it was only in 2005 when a 5% compulsory 
reduction of direct payments of farms receiving more than 
€5,000 (modulation) was first implemented, transferring 
funds from the first pillar of the CAP to the second. From 
2009 as a part of a political compromise, modulation rates 
were stepwise increased to 10% until 2012 and set 4% higher 
for large farms (progressive modulation) in the belief that the 
issue has completely been solved (Anania-D’Andrea, 2015).
In the Commission’s original proposal published in Octo-
ber 2011 (European Commission 2011a), direct payments 
were proposed to be reduced by 20% for the tranche of more 
than €150,000 and up to €200,000; by 40% for the tranche 
of more than €200,000 and up to €250,000; by 70% for the 
tranche of more than €250,000 and up to €300,000 and by 
100% for the tranche of more than €300,000. However, 
the Commission allowed these amounts to be ‘calculated 
by subtracting the salaries effectively paid and declared by 
the farmer in the previous year, including taxes and social 
contributions related to employment, from the total amount 
of direct payments initially due to the farmer without taking 
into account the payments to be granted pursuant to Chapter 
2 of Title III of this Regulation’ (EC, 2011a, p 28.). The text 
also added that ‘Member States shall ensure that no payment 
is made to farmers for whom it is established that, as from 
the date of publication of the Commission proposal for this 
Regulation, they artificially created the conditions to avoid 
the effects of this Article’ (EC, 2011a, p 29.). 
There has been a heavy debate on the original proposal 
above. Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Romania, Czech Repub-
lic, Slovakia, Sweden and the Netherlands rejected any cap-
ping on direct payments by arguing that capping would dis-
criminate between farms according to their size, contradicting 
the original principles of the CAP Sahrbacher et al., (2015). 
These countries also argued that capping would result in artifi-
cial split of large farms (see next section for evidence). 
However, at the other end, Bulgaria, Austria and Poland 
were in favour of capping, mainly because of their extremely 
concentrated farm structures as well as their relatively dis-
advantaged positions in terms of direct payments per hec-
tare. Another argument against capping was that several 
New Member States inherited dual farm structures from the 
socialist era, dominated by large-scale units. However, as 
salaries and wage levels were relatively low in this part of 
Europe, these countries would have been the most affected in 
degressivity and capping (Sahrbacher et al., 2015).
All in all, the final decision introduced a mandatory 
reduction of 5% for the part of basic payments exceeding 
€150,000. Member states, however, are allowed to increase 
the degressivity rate up to 100%, making de facto the 
€150,000 threshold a ‘cap’ on basic payments. Member states 
were also allowed by the Ciolos-reform to apply the reduc-
tion after deducting labour costs of the previous year from 
the basic payment. Such ‘savings’ resulting from degressiv-
ity were then to be added to the EAFRD ‘envelope’, free 
of any co-financing by the member state. Note that member 
states were exempted from mandatory degressivity if vol-
untary redistributive payments were implemented, absorb-
ing more than 5% of its ceiling for direct payments (Anania-
D’Andrea, 2013). 
In practice, fifteen member states where degressivity was 
implemented decided to apply the minimum possible per-
centage cut (without imposing any cap), while nine member 
states decided to put a cap on direct payments (Table 2). The 
EC estimated that for the period 2015-19, degressivity and 
capping would result in a ‘saving’ of €112 million, which is 
less than 0.3% of the financial resources allocated to direct 
payments in the EU-28 (Anania and D’Andrea, 2015). Such 
a low rate of ‘savings’, however, was not a surprise after the 
Commission’s initial impact assessment (EC, 2011b), which 
talked about a 1.3% release of the total amount of direct pay-
ments at the EU level, equivalent to around €590 million. 
Sahrbacher et al., (2015) highlight that this was much less 
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than the amounts coming from modulation (around 3 billion 
in 2013), while Matthews (2016) shows that by introducing 
degressivity and capping, Member States reduced their EU 
direct payment envelopes, as laid down in Annex II of Regu-
lation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, by around €109 million, in 2015. Almost two-
thirds of this reduction was committed by Hungary.
As to the latest reform ideas, In its Communication “The 
Future of Food and Farming” of 29 November 2017 (Euro-
pean Commission, 2017), the European Commission pro-
claims capping as compulsory, and would allow for Member 
States to introduce or maintain the degressive reduction of 
direct payments. As for the capping of direct payments, costs 
of labour could be considered to avoid negative effects on 
jobs. Member States would be also encouraged to redistrib-
ute direct payments to better target small agricultural hold-
ings. These would be the tools of the post-2020 CAP which 
could influence the distribution of direct payments among 
the beneficiaries. 
The uneven distribution of direct 
payments in Europe
On average, 80% of the beneficiaries (88% for Bulgaria 
and Romania) received around 20% of direct payments in 
2015 with important differences among member states (EC, 
2015). A detailed analysis of the respective dataset provides 
further information on the payments related to degressivity/
capping (Table 3). 
German farms received above €150 thousand, the high-
est amount in the EU-28 in 2015, while the highest share of 
direct payments under degressivity was found in Slovakia 
(71% of payments were made above this threshold). The 
highest number of beneficiaries receiving direct payments 
above €150 thousand could also be found in Germany (Table 
3). The highest share in this regard is observable for Czech 
Republic (5.17%). Moreover, the average payment above 
€150 thousand to recipients was the highest in Croatia 
(almost €500,000 per beneficiary).
The idea of degressivity/capping described above, how-
ever, is not theoretically perfect. Bureau and Mahé (2015), 
for instance, found capping of payments almost completely 
ineffective at the European level. By allowing member 
states to choose different degressivity/capping options, the 
equal distribution of direct payments remains only rhetoric. 
The authors find a ‘general reluctance’ of member states to 
introduce effective capping. They also argued that deducing 
labour costs is a strange way of fostering rural employment 
as wage rates were mainly set by the national labour market, 
thereby resulting in a biased transfer of land and capital to 
labour. Moreover, heterogeneous proportions of large farms 
across Europe also make the capping idea hard to implement. 
Table 2: Degressivity and capping applied by the EU Member States
Country Degressivity Capping
Austria YES Cap at 150,000€
Belgium (Flanders) YES Cap at 150,000€
Bulgaria YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ Cap at 300,000€
Cyprus YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Czech Republic YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Denmark YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Estonia YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Finland YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Greece NO Cap at 150,000€
Hungary YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ Cap at 176,000€
Ireland NO Cap at 150,000€
Italy YES, cut of 50% above 150,000€ Cap at 500,000€
Latvia YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Luxembourg YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Malta YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Netherlands YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Poland NO Cap at 150,000€
Portugal YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Slovakia YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Slovenia YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Spain YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
Sweden YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
United Kingdom (England) YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ NO
United Kingdom (Northern Ireland) NO Cap at 150,000€
United Kingdom (Wales) YES, cut of 15% above 150,000€,  progressively increasing up to 300,000€, Cap at 300,000€
United Kingdom (Scotland) YES, cut of 5% above 150,000€ Cap at 500,000€
Note: The table just contains countries applying degressivity/capping 
Source: Own composition based on Anania and D’Andrea (2015)
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Table 3: Direct payments paid above €150,000 by member state, 2015
Country Amount paid  (in 000 €) Out of total (%)
Number of  
beneficiaries
Out of total (%) Average payment to 
recipients (in €)
Austria 11,213 1.59 41 0.01 273,488
Belgium 11,440 2.08 58 0.17 197,241
Bulgaria 203,577 31.62 709 0.72 287,133
Croatia 25,747 16.16 52 0.01 495,134
Cyprus 695 1.35 4 0.01 173,750
Czech Republic 583,062 66.07 1,543 5.17 377,876
Denmark 164,160 17.42 747 2.53 219,759
Estonia 20,393 18.42 87 0.51 234,402
Finland 5,570 1.06 29 0.01 192,069
France 254,786 3.35 883 0.24 288,546
Germany 1,130,648 21.99 3,545 1.12 318,942
Greece 1,727 0.08 10 0.01 172,700
Hungary 432,039 33.63 1,090 0.01 396,366
Ireland 12,263 11.08 64 0.01 191,609
Italy 426,730 10.86 1,588 0.14 268,722
Latvia 13,153 8.40 59 0.01 222,932
Lithuania 38,116 9.67 144 0.10 264,694
Luxembourg 407 1.23 2 0.01 203,500
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 46,548 5.82 209 0.44 222,287
Poland 222,663 6.64 728 0.01 305,856
Portugal 76,957 11.93 335 0.21 229,722
Romania 233,581 16.46 785 0.01 297,555
Slovakia 305,630 70.87 816 4.62 374,547
Slovenia 7,554 5.56 16 0.01 472,125
Spain 417,361 0.08 1,569 0.01 266,004
Sweden 44,898 6.53 205 0.33 219,015
United Kingdom 431,485 13.87 1,714 1.03 251,742
EU-28 5,122,413 12.14 17,032 0.24 300,752
Source: Own calculations based on DG AGRI (2015)
The average amount deduced was €144,531 in 2015 and 
€153,022 in 2016. The total amount ‘saved’ by degressivity 
was €46,371,476 in 2015 €39,331,252 in 2016 (compared to 
€69,746,000 in 2015 and €68,961,000 in 2016 moved from 
the first pillar to the second).
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Figure 1: Distribution of direct payments and beneficiaries in 
Hungary, by amount received (thousand euro), 2015 financial year
Source: Own composition based on DG AGRI (2015) data
New evidence from Hungary1
According to the latest national statistics (HCSO, 
2017), there were 9 thousand agricultural enterprises and 
416 thousand agricultural holdings engaged in agriculture 
in 2016. However, many of the latter were subsistence or 
semi-subsistance farmers cultivating agricultural areas 
less than one hectare. According to the Hungarian Paying 
Agency, however, there were only 173,578 farms applying 
for direct payments in 2016, accounting for 41% of total 
farms. 
The distribution of direct payments in Hungary is well 
in line with European evidence (Figure 1). Almost 50% of 
beneficiaries received less than 5% of the total payments, 
while 34% of payments were received by 1% of the benefi-
ciaries. Most beneficiaries receive direct payments between 
€500 and €1250 (small farmers), while the highest amount of 
payments pertain to the €20-50 thousand size category.
In terms of degressivity/capping, Hungary chose to apply 
a 5% cut above €150,000 and a cap at €176,000, as evident 
from Table 1. Degressivity was applied to 568 farms in 
2015 (out of which capping was applied to 74) and to 534 
farms in 2016 (out of which capping was applied to 60).
1 All data in this section are from the Hungarian Paying Agency. 
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As a new result, the number of farms by physical size 
categories before and after degressivity/capping was imple-
mented is analysed here. Results echo the fear of Bureau and 
Mahé (2015), suggesting that degressivity/capping leads to 
the splitting up of farms. As it is observable from Table 4, the 
number of farms with over 1200 hectares UAA (affected by 
capping) decreased by 26% and by 41% from 2014 to 2015 
and 2016, respectively. In contrast to this decline, the num-
ber of farms with 600-1200 hectares UAA increased by 36% 
from 2014 to 2016, while the number of farms with 300-600 
hectares UAA also grew by 15%.
However, note that changes above are also due to the 
new Land Transaction Act in force since 2014. According to 
this, only active farmers (and their family members) living in 
Hungary and obtaining at least a secondary agricultural and/
or forestry qualification can buy land up to 300 hectares in 
total. National and foreign legal entities are excluded from 
the Hungarian land market. Moreover, the total area of land 
used by farmers cannot exceed 1,200 hectares (except for 
livestock farms and seed producers where the limit is 1,800 
hectares). Furthermore, in the new Land Transaction Act, 
pre-emption rights are provided for the Hungarian State, the 
farmer using the land, the neighbouring farmers, local farm-
ers and farmers living within a 20 km distance. 
All the above creates high administrative burdens and 
strong state control for local land markets. In terms of land 
use regulations, Hungarian land policy favours family farms 
instead of large farms, in line with its capping ceilings (note 
that €176,000 euro corresponds to 1200 ha in Hungary). On 
the whole, land regulations together with degressivity/cap-
ping are both responsible for the splitting up of large farms. 
Conclusions
The paper has analysed the impact of degressivity and cap-
ping on European farm structures by reviewing the literature 
and showing new evidence from Hungary. Results suggests 
that the CAP has had a high impact on farm structures. The 
vast majority of the studies conclude that government inter-
vention slows down structural change in European agricul-
ture, though the overall impact of different policy measures is 
rather mixed. Subsidies keep labour and farms in agriculture, 
and therefore also act against structural change necessary for 
productivity purposes. This somehow echoes the original 
dilemma – whether the CAP wants European agriculture to 
become productive (competitive) or socially fair (inclusive). 
The answer seems to be both as the political economy 
analysis of degressivity and capping suggests. The aim of 
direct payments is at least as much to increase competitive-
ness of farms as to be socially fair and equal by redistrib-
uting payments by farm size. However, as is evident from 
the above data, capping seems to be causing more harm 
than good. As the Hungarian example shows, it has actu-
ally decreased farm sizes and contributed to massive farm 
splitting. Therefore, the question today pertains not to the 
exact rate of degressivity and capping but rather to its very 
existence as the continuation of this idea seems to lead to the 
creation of smaller and hence less competitive farms. The 
idea of capping has, in practice, had results the opposite of 
what was intended.
Table 4: Number of farms by physical size categories in Hungary, 2012-2016
 Farm size (UAA) 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
0-3 ha 58,546 59,732 60,143 55,373 54,922
3.01-5.00 ha 25,448 25,653 25,280 25,698 25,456
5.01-10.00 ha 32,214 32,433 32,134 33,808 33,863
10.01-25.00 ha 30,465 30,280 30,195 28,961 28,572
25.01-50.00 ha 12,997 13,032 13,024 13,035 13,044
50.01-100.00 ha 7,689 7,761 7,792 8,170 8,308
100.01-300.00 ha 6,509 6,574 6,669 6,979 7,154
300.01-600.00 ha 981 982 1,067 1,231 1,227
600.01-1,200.00 ha 556 566 565 701 773
1,200.01 ha - 477 443 439 323 259
Total 175,882 177,456 177,308 174,279 173,578
Source: Own composition based on Hungarian Paying Agency data 
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